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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Aggregate agricultural policies of a nation are expressed in a complexity of OpInIOns and laws which 
hequently are subject to revision and displacement. The periphery of agricultural policies have been vastly 
extended during the past 4 decades. Specific price programs, each with its own particular objective, have 
been sought to give expression to general agricultural policy. 
Legislatio.n affecting the rice industry was outlined in Texas Station Bulletin 839, "Legislation Affect-
ing the Rice Industry, 1933-56," and physical factors, production trends, markets, utilization and government 
loan and purchase operations were included in Texas Station Bulletin 850, "Rice Supply, Demand and 
Related Government Programs." 
This publication reports the results of analyses of the effects of specified factors presumed to be 
responsible for the variations in the supply of and dema.nd for rice, both domestic and foreign. All analyses 
were confined to data within the period covered by the 1921-54 crop years. 
Statistical analyses involve two supply equations, four demand equatio.ns, alternate analyses of price-
production variations and probable position of rice under free market, flexible and two-price programs. 
Rice acreage and yield were correlated with 1 and 2 years lagged prices, except that time was included 
as an additional variable in the yield equation. 
Acreage was not influenced by preceding crop year prices before World War II, but was affected 
considerably more when postwar prices were included. Government support prices and an ever expand:' 
ing market for rice during and immediately after World War II contributed more than o·ther factors to the 
variations in rice acreage. 
The time factor alone accounted for about 87 percent of the variation in yield with no change in' its 
attributable affect when postwar data were included. The most noticeable increases in yield after 
1954 resulted primarily from increased usage of fertilizers to compensate for acreage restrictions and 
marketing quotas. 
Domestic per capita consumption of rice is relatively constant. Prices and per capita income had no 
measurable effect on variations in per capita consumption of rice. Government support prices had no 
influence on per capita consumption as reflected by no noticeable change in the average rate of per capita 
consumption after the War. It appears that rice purchases are based in a large measure on "impluse" 
buying. If this were true, a merchandising campaign should increase the rate of rice consumption above 
the normal increase resulti.ng from the rate of population growth. 
Rice exports presented no serious rice disposal problem until after 1953. In the analyses, however, the 
price differential between the United States price and the world price was correlated with exports. Post 
World War II data on world prices were not available. Prior to the War, the price difference accounted 
for about 41 percent of the variation in rice exports. This would be expected since most of the United States 
rice was shipped to Cuba. Therefore, the J apa.nese and United States price difference could not reflect 
accurately the volume going to Cuba particularly under reciprocal trade agreements. The principal 
difficulty with United States rice exports after 1933 resulted from United States support prices exceeding too 
greatly the level of world prices. Also, rice producing countries in Asia had made considerable progress 
by 1954 toward relocating the rice industry in the Orient. 
Rice storage quantities were correlated only with deflated domestic prices. The domestic price variable 
accounted for about 33 percent of the variation in rice storage during the 1921-40 period and only 1 percent 
with postwar prices included in the analysis. After World War II, domestic prices were so attractive and 
guaranteed support prices were at such levels as to discourage rice storage during 1941-53. Government 
warehouses received surplus stocks of rice after 1953 because of loan and purchase agreements. The 
YOlume of rice that is stored, assuming storage facilities are available, is governed solely by the amount 
of profit expected from holding rice for future sale or the urgency of fina.ncial needs at the time of harvest. 
World price for the 1921-40 period, using Japanese rice prices, was correlated with the world rice 
trade, time and the international commodity trade index. The international commodity trade index and 
. e influenced considerably the variation in world prices during the 1921-40 period. World trade in rice, 
which is about 5 perce.nt of the world production, accounted for less than 1 percent of the variation in 
world rice prices. The analysis on world price did not include postwar data since reliabJe Japanese prices 
re not avai'abl.e after 1940. Asiatic consumers will continue to purchase lower quality rice at lower 
'ces "n the world market rather than purchase United States rice if our domestic prices are much greater 
the world price level. 
The coefficient of variation tech.nique was used to estimate the difference in the variation of rice 
'ces and production during periods before and during government programs. The variation was based 
the average price and average production as well as year-to-year deviations during these specified 
·ods. Under direct support prices, rice prices varied less than production, irrespective of the base period. 
. stability i.n price and income could be expected since the domestic and foreign demand was relatively 
tant. Rice production and demand, however, approached equilibrium with the 1953 crop. 
A regression analysis to determine demand relationships between rice and potatoes was used in data 
two time periods, 1920-40 and J.921-54. Rice showed slight evidence of substitutability for potatoes 
, 9 the 1921-40 period and showed evidence of complementarity for the 1921-54 period. However, not 
ch confidence can be placed in the two equatio:ls connoting complementarity since the two regression 
'dents in the equations did not differ significantly from zero. 
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~ TABLE 1. DATA USED IN THE FIVE-EQUATIONS OF RICE ECONOMY, 1921-40 AND 1946-54 
Year 
beginning Ad-
August 1 justed 
supply 
Per 
capita 
con-
sump-
tion 
Domestic 
Exports 
includ-
ing 
ship-
ments 
Ending 
stocks 
World 
trade 
Japanese 
price 
corrected 
to United 
States 
currencyl 
United Index of 
States prices 
seasonal paid by 
average farmers, 
on-farm 1935-39 
price =100 
Thous. cwt. Pounds - - - Thous. cwt. - ::....- - - Dols. per cwt. -
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1:927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
20,~91 
20,584 
17,354 
15,045 
14,876 
20,661 
22,814 
22.495 
20,261 
21.584 
22,136 
21.769 
17,276 
18,977 
17.448 
21.770 
23,865 
24,814 
26,512 
26,221 
25,619 
29.434 
30,831 
34,507 
35,717 
39,127 
39,106 
49.725 
7.19 
8.23 
8.16 
8.42 
8.10 
8.80 
9.58 
8.41 
8.24 
8.98 
8.24 
9.42 
6.79 
9.80 
8.22 
9.94 
9.61 
8.79 
9.45 
9.24 
6.96 
7.57 
7.70 
7.94 
8.91 
7.80 
8.29 
8.31 
11,830 
9,538 
7,584 
5,292 
4,230 
8,676 
8,938 
10,692 
9.108 
9,200 
8,876 
8,062 
6,092 
6,783 
5,734 
6,338 
10,154 
9,842 
9,914 
11.413 
1.338 
2,046 
708 
230 
1.323 
1.723 
2,538 
1.723 
1.169 
1.384 
3,076 
1.984 
2,676 
826 
1,288 
2,740 
2,365 
3,596 
4,276 
2,656 
668 
414 
1.1l6 
2,329 
3,316 
1.392 
682 
6.898 
175.416 
184,237 
192,174 
202,752 
216.409 
237.428 
256,910 
232,798 
219,563 
224,778 
238,757 
247,657 
243,338 
244,644 
239.497 
247,301 
237.480 
267,839 
205,828 
235.435 
5.01 
5.28 
4.94 
5.40 
5.66 
5.72 
4.96 
4.36 
4.35 
3.60 
3.65 
1.54 
2.17 
2.50 
2.80 
2.86 
3.03 
3.06 
2,,99 
3.22 
2.18 
2.19 
2.49 
2.99 
3.30 
2.51 
2.02 
2.03 
2.22 
1.74 
1.08 
.93 
1.73 
1.76 
1.60 
1.85 
1.46 
1.42 
1.62 
1.80 
5.00 
5.97 
4.88 
4.10 
5.09 
4.82 
5.87 
5.19 
153 
155 
166 
169 
168 
166 
166 
167 
164 
150 
130 
173 
126 
131 
126 
133 
129 
124 
125 
126 
208 
240 
260 
251 
256 
282 
287 
279 
Cost per cwt. Index numbers of 
wholesale prices 
Jap-
anese 
import 
duties2 
Cents 
36 
36 
37 
31 
31 
36 
36 
35 
35 
37 
37 
29 
.39 
45 
43 
44 
44 
43 
39 
35 
Ocean 
freight, Statist 
San Fran- index, 
cisco to 1910-14 
Yoko- =100 
hama 
Cents 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
60 
50 
50 
60 
60 
60 
70 
82 
70 
98 
116 
116 
134 
134 
134 
146 
96 
158 
165.7 
156.8 
161.3 
169.3 
155.2 
151.0 
147.4 
140.8 
125.6 
103.9 
98.9 
95.3 
97.8 
100.2 
103.4 
119.9 
116.1 
107.3 
141.9 
165.2 
246.3 
299.2 
319.4 
359.0 
466.1 
467.7 
446.1 
434.1 
All 
Commo-
dities 
index 
B.L.S. 
94.2 
101.1 
97.9 
101.2 
102.1 
96.5 
96.4 
96.2 
91.5 
78.0 
67.5 
63.3 
72.4 
78.4 
80.2 
85.2 
81.6 
76.9 
78.4 
81.7 
140.2 
157.0 
157.2 
152.1 
173.2 
173.4 
169.8 
170.0 
Hourly 
earnings 
of factory 
workers 
Cents 
51.5 
48.7 
52.2 
54.7 
54.7 
54.8 
55.0 
56.2 
56.6 
55.2 
51.5 
44.6 
44.2 
53.2 
55.0 
55.6 
62.4 
62.7 
63.3 
66.1 
108.6 
123.7 
135.0 
140.1 
146.5 
159.0 
167.0 
177.0 
Per 
capita 
income 
Dols. per 
person 
512.1 
545.0 
621.2 
610.0 
640.6 
654.8 
648.4 
656.2 
685.9 
607.2 
516.3 
390.9 
365.3 
412.5 
459.7 
518.5 
552.6 
507.8 
540.2 
578.7 
1.131.4 
1.183.3 
1.289.6 
1.271.3 
1,369.4 
1.476.9 
1.519.6 
1.580.3 
Yield 
Acreage per 
planted planted 
acre 
Thous. 
acres 
990 
1.053 
874 
838 
853 
1.016 
1,027 
972 
860 
966 
965 
874 
798 
812 
817 
981 
1.116 
1.076 
1.045 
1,090 
1.595 
1.719 
1,826 
1,882 
1.632 
1.998 
2,006 
3,174 
Cwt. 
17.85 
17.80 
17.11 
17.53 
17.43 
18.61 
19.50 
20.29 
20.69 
20.93 
20.80 
21.43 
21.23 
21.64 
21.73 
22.85 
21.54 
21.96 
23.28 
22.48 
20.37 
20.49 
20.96 
21.63 
23.71 
22.92 
23.98 
24.08 
Statistical Analyses of Rice Supply and Demand 
Before and During Government Programs 
JOHN A. KINCANNON, Assistant Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology 
THIS IS THE LAST OF A SERIES of three publica-tions which evaluate federal price support 
programs relating to the rice industry. Bulletin 
839 reviews legislation affecting the rice indus-
try, while Bulletin 850 outlines government op-
erations and discusses the physical factors, pro-
duction and marketing of rice. 
This publication discusses efforts to determine 
tatistically the extent to which principal eco-
nomic forces affect the supply of and the demand 
for rice, both foreign and domestic. The quan-
titative factors chosen for the analyses were not 
entirely relevant in explaining the variation in 
the dependent variables. However, when the 
equations were fitted to postwar data, consider-
able improvement in the relevancy of the factors 
was evident. 
Because of the extremely complex nature and 
relatively unique characteristics of the rice in-
dustry, the task of discovering the measurable 
factors that account for the changing demand for 
rice is extremely difficult. 
Recent trends in quantitative research in eco-
nomics have demonstrated the need for struc-
tural estimation when the end is one of advice on 
policies of the government and the firm. This 
has led to greater emphasis on the estimation of 
the parameters of the basic economic relations as 
opposed to the more superficial analysis of mar-
ket barometers. The more scientific approach 
through statistical analyses in quantitative eco-
nomic research has been genera ted by the desire 
and need to provide those responsible for choice 
with reasonably accurate estimates of the future 
path of each revel ant variable given the alter-
native courses of policy action. 
If these analyses only serve the purpose of de-
picting some of the complexities and magnitudes 
of the problems facing the rice industry and en-
gender further thought and patience toward de-
ducing value judgements and investigating qual-
itative concepts, it shall have made some contri-
butioll. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The practical purpose of quantitative analyses 
is to be able to forecast with a certain degree of 
probability the economic results of decisions in 
order to lay before those responsible for choice 
the consequence of alternative courses of action. 
Therefore, the main objective will be to use these 
tatistical estimations in evaluating quantita-
tively those factors which appear to influence 
fluctuations in the supply of and the demand for 
rice. In order to derive empirically the effect of 
each of these factors and to study the mutual in-
terdependence of the variables in the various sec-
tors of the rice economy, it is necessary to estab-
lish a complete determinate system of relations 
that ties many economic variables together. This 
type of approach will require 5 to 10 more years 
of postwar data. 
The quantitative characteristics of the rice 
model outlined in this publication, if properly con-
strued and applied, should enable the analyst to 
more easly forecast, with a specified level of prob-
ability, the most probable magnitudes of such 
factors as price, production and consumption un-
der specified conditions. Such knowledge of the 
structural relations and parameter estimates is 
obviously a prerequisite for intelligent formula-
tion of government policy and for resource allo-
cation by the firm or entrepreneur. 
A corollary objective is the detection and de-
lineation of the weaknesses in the methodologies. 
These weaknesses, however, can be improved in 
future statistical research as new and more effi-
cient use of economic research tools and a broad-
er knowledge of the interrelationships of the var-
iables affecting the rice economy ar~ achieved. 
This study might be fruitful in pointing out ad-
vantages in combining the tools of economic 
theory and statistics into a common approach rel-
ative to problem-solving in the rice industry. Too, 
these analyses are intended to point up the inade-
quacy and spuriousness of the basic model data. 
ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF 
ANALYSES 
Agricultural economists have formulated and 
developed a vast reservoir of analytical tools for 
examining the forces of demand for farm prod-
ucts during the past 3 decades. 
In a majority of cases, the single equation ap-
proach suffices to measure the demand relation-
ships sought. However, if there are two or more 
variables within a single equation that are inter-
dependent, which implies that they are determin-
ed simultaneously by the same set of economic 
forces, then they should be solved simultaneously 
if an unbiased etsimate of the price elasticity of 
demand is desired. However, an unbiased esti-
mate of the price elasticity of demand can be ob-
tained statistically: (1) if consumer income is not 
affected by a change in the current price or con-
sumption of the commodity, (2) if there is not 
more than one outlet (consumption, industry, ex-
ports, by-products, etc.), (3) if the supply of a 
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competing commodity is not affected by a change 
in the current price of the given commodity, (4) 
if production is not affected by the price during 
the current marketing year and (5) if consump-
tion is not affected by a change in the current 
price or by the demand for storage or exports. 
STATISTICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
ANALYSES 
Considerable difficulty was encountered in ob-
taining the necessary data for the world price and 
export equations. Data used in the 6 equation 
model are shown in Table 1 and all data are pre-
sented on rough rice basis for the sake of conti-
nuity in the analyses. 
Data that were the most difficult to obtain 
were Japanese prices at Yokohama, Japanese im-
port duties and ocean freight charges on Japa-
nese rice imports. These data might not be as 
reliable as other data shown in Table 1, neverthe-
less, they were used in equations 4.0 and 6.0. 
In the world price equation, X2, the statist in-
dex was used as a demand shifter. The variable 
was used to place rice on a comparable purchasing 
power with other important commodities in world 
trade. In equations 1.0, 1.1, 2.0 and 2.1, I-year 
and 2-year lagged prices were used to determine 
whether prices immediately preceding a crop year 
affected acreage changes. The lagged prices were 
deflated by the index of prices paid by farmers 
in order to hold production costs constant. 
Factory earnings were used as an index of 
marketing costs in equations 3.0 and 3.1. This 
was done to represent as close as possible trans-
portation and labor costs. Transportation and 
labor costs are considered to be very salient fac-
tors in ascertaining marketing costs. Per capita 
income was used as a demand shifter in both 
equations. 
In the export equation, 4.0, the difference be-
tween the world price and the domestic price plus 
ocean freight charges and Japanese import duties 
was deemed sufficient to estimate most of the 
variation in exports. 
The deflated domestic price was used in equa-
tions 5.0 and 5.1 to estimate storage. The all-
commodities index was used to deflate the prices. 
This was done to place rice on a comparable basis 
with other domestic market commodities. 
All other variables in the equations are self ex-
planatory. 
The world price and export equations were fit-
ted only to data during 1921-40. The other four 
equations were fitted to the 1921-40 and 1946-54 
data. Postwar data could not be used in the equa-
tions relating to world price and exports because 
the Japanese price has been under direct govern-
ment control since 1942. As a consequence, the 
world price equation was no further use after 
1940. The export equation could serve no further 
use since the world price had to be estimated first 
before the probable quantities exported could be 
estimated. 
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THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
The economic model to be presented ret)reslentll~ 
an effort to ascertain the assumed behavior 
the various rice market sectors of the econolll. 
as affected by government price programs. 
nomic theory must of necessity be n'(1I{,\l'T'nl'~lt" 
in the design of an economic model in 
make appropriate choices of pertinent 
variables so far as possible. 
The six equation model consists of two 
equations and four demand equations. The 
endogenous variables in the supply equations 
acreage and yield. The four endogenous 
in the demand equations are per capita 
tion, export, storage and the world price. 
The model was designed originally to be 
ed by the limited information method. The 
ited information approach is thought by 
economists to be superior to the classic 
squares approach. This is particularly true 
only a few variables are sufficient in 
equation of the model to estimate the v . 
in the endogenous variables. 
variables are those variables 
determined within the system. 
Exogenous variables, on the other hand, 
independent of the structural relations. 
fluence the endogenous variables, but are 
turn, influenced by them. Exogenous and 
endogenous variables are considered as 
termined variables. In this system, the 
dent variables in the supply equations are 
endogenous. That is to say, current rice 
and acreage are assumed to be affected, 
the current market prices, but by the 
years preceding the current crop year. The 
squares model approach is sufficient if all 
pendent variables are predetermined and 
fice irrespective of the structural relat,lUJ1lSllllll 
only the degree of association between 
is desired. If an unbiased estimate of 
elasticity of demand is desired in an 
fied system, a simultaneous solution of the 
tions will yield more reliable estimates of the 
ameters. 
The equations in the model are An,r. ... "".no'n .... 
if the total number of variables in the 
minus the number of variables in a 
equation are in excess of the number 
ous variables in the system less one. The 
is over-identified but the equations were not 
ed simultaneously because there were not 
post World War II observations for the 
THE RICE SUPPLY EQUATIONS 
The analyses of the two supply 
(acreage and yield) are presented first to 
broader perspective of the quantities of rice 
able for the various market outlets. Only by 
ing formulated initially a mental picture of 
source and magnitudes of rice supplies can 
preciate and understand the many _nY~'+"';AA" 
and complexities of the factors affecting 
mand for rice. 
Acreage 
Rice acreage expansion or contraction is con-
sidered by the producer in the light of the rela-
tive profitability of alternative uses of his re-
sources and the expected returns on his invest-
ments. Therefore, the average price received for 
rice 1 year and for 2 years preceding a ,crop year 
were considered for this study to be the most de-
cisive economic factors affecting acreage expan-
sion or contraction. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING ACREAGE 
The acreage equation that was fitted to the 
1923-40 data, pr'esented graphically in Figure 1 
was to ascertain the extent to which previous 
prices influenced the rice producer's decision to 
plant the same acreage or whether to contract or 
expand acreage. 
The statistical analysis relating acreage to 1 
and 2-year lagged prices using only 1921-40 data 
is: 
EQUATION 1.0 
Y = 792.3 - 9.684 Xl + 125.1 X2 (9.74) (97.0) 
Y = United States rice acreage (1,000 acres) 
Xl == 1 year lagged prices (dol. per cwt.), de-
flated by the index of prices paid 
X2 == 2 year lagged prices (dol. per cwt.), de-
flated by the index of prices paid 
The figures in parentheses are the standard 
errors of the regression coefficients for all equa-
tions in this publication. 
The statistical analysis relating acreage to 1 
and 2-year lagged prices, using 1923-40 and 1948-
54 data, presented graphically in Figure 2, is: 
EQUATION 1.1 
Y = - 145.9 + 440.2 Xl + 486.3 X2 (264.7) (246.3) 
RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
FOR RICE ACREAGE 
The analysis clearly exemplifies the futility 
of attempting to attribute changes in rice acre-
age to rice prices received in not more than 2 
years preceding a crop year, particularly in the 
1921-40 period. The influence of lagged prices 
was strengthened considerably when the 1946-54 
data were included with the 1921-40 data. This 
contention is vindicated by the value of R2y.12. The 
following correlation coefficients relate to the 
acreage analysis: 
Values 1921-40 
Coefficients Values 1921-40 and 1946-54 
R2y.12 .01 .51 
R2y.2 .08 .48 
R2y.1 0 .45 
r2Y1.2 0 .07 
r2y2.1 .01 .11 
Sy.12 103.56 355.17 
The coefficients of Xl and X2 in equation 1.0 
do not differ significantly from zero at the 10 
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Figure 1. Rice acreage planted, actuaL estimated and 
unexplained residuals, United States, 1923-40. 
percent probability level. The sign of the coeffi-
cient of Xl is not as expected but needs no ex-
planation since it does not differ significantly 
from zero. The coefficient of Xl in equation 1.1 is 
questionable-it could or could not differ signifi-
cantly from zero. The values of the coefficients 
of determination (R2y.12, R2y.2 and R2y.l ) readily 
indicate that the lagged price variables accounted 
for a larger proportion of the variation in acreage 
during the postwar period than did they in the 
prewar period. Too, R2 y.l shows that rice prices 
in the year just preceding the crop year had no 
effect on decisions as whether to plant the same 
acreage, expand or to reduce rice acreage. The 
partial correlation coefficient r2y2.1 also substan-
tiates this contention. 
Patriotic emphasis on food, feed and attrac-
tive prices under administered government price 
programs were the more cogent reasons for the 
rapid expansion in United States rice acreage dur-
ing and after W orld War II. 
Figure 1 shows the graph of the estimated 
acreages, determined by Xl and X2 for the 1923-
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Figure 2. Rice acreage planted, actual, estimated and 
unexplained residuals, United States, 1923-40 and 1948-54. 
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40 period, as compared with the actual acreages. 
The unexplained residuals readily reflect the ex-
clusion of other necessary economic factors in 
actually accounting for rice acreage decisions. 
The larger disturbance and the distribution of 
the residuals graphed in Figure 2, for the 1923-
40 and 1948-54 periods, readily depict the en-
croachment of errors, inexplicable qualitative con-
cepts and guaranteed current prices during the 
postwar years. Table 2 shows the exact percent-
age relationship between actual and estimated 
acreage. The two independent or predetermined 
variables Xl and X2 came very close to explain-
ing the variation in acreage during 1926-32. 
As indicated by R2y.l2, Xl and X2 did not ac-
count for any variation in acreage during the 
1921-40 period. In the 194'6-54 period Xl and X2 
did account for 51 percent of the acreage varia-
tion. However, the standard error (Sy. l2) of the 
dependent variable, with postwar years included, 
was about 3.5 times greater than the standard 
error of estimate in the 1921-40 period. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE ANALYSIS ON ACREAGE 
In any regression analyses, the primary pur-
pose in obtaining an estimate of the coefficients 
is to measure the relationship of each independ-
ent variable to the dependent varibale and to 
predict what might be a reasonable estimate of 
the coefficients for some specified future period. 
The weakness, however, in making such use of 
statistical estimates is the tacit assumption that 
conditions not included in the analyses do not 
change through time. Too, not much confidence 
can be placed in the analyses unless the unex-
plained residuals are readily explainable by fac-
tors not included in the previous choice of inde-
pendent variables. Equation 1.0 explained only 
1 percent of the variation in acreage, but with 
only 7 years of postwar data included with the 
1921-40 period, it accounted for 50 percent more 
of the variation in rice acreage. 
TABLE 2. RICE ACREAGE PLANTED, IN RELATION TO 
ESTIMATED ACREAGE PLANTED, 1923-40 
a 
Year 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Actual acreage planted as percent-
age of estimated acreage planted 
91 
88 
88 
102 
100 
100 
92 
104 
102 
94 
90 
96 
86 
104 
119 
113 
113 
118 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
To infer from the analysis that rice 
any particular year preceding a rice crop 
have no effect on a producer's decision 
whether to change his rice acreage would 
rious reasoning. In the 1921-40 period, 
ducers were reluctant to make any 
ments in their operations unless they 
haps 3 or more consecutive years of 
rice prices. In the 1946-54 period, 
sions were governed to a considerable 
the government's guaranteed current price. 
ever, the explained variation in rice 
the 1921-40 and 1946-54 periods was 
higher. This could have resulted from 
tractive rice prices immediately preceding 
year, thus attracting more firms into the 
dustry and also enabling the established 
to expand. 
Certain general conclusions stand, 
reconciling the difference between the 
ods. These are: 
Based on the 1921-40 Data 
1. That rice prices would perhaps have 
favorable or unfavorable for 3 or more 
ceding a crop year to induce a farmer to 
or contract his acreage. 
2. That rice farmers could not respond 
changes as rapidly in the 1921-40 period 
could in the 1946-54 period. This was a 
producers not having the advantages of 
nological advances and innovations that 
joyed by present-day farmers. 
Additional Considerations 
1. That many farmers were restricted 
available rice acreage in the 1921-40 
2. Reclaiming marsh land with n ... ;"",;+"" 
chinery was very expensive. 
3. Lack of technological advances and 
vations discouraged acreage expansion in 
industry during this period; new rice 
were introduced in the late 1930's. 
4. Insufficient capital outlays and 
credit sources in many instances retarded 
res~ in decisions to expand rice acreage. 
Based on the 1921-40 and 1946-54 Data 
1. Extremely attractive rice prices 
1946-54 period offered considerable 
for acreage expansion, ai reflected by the 
ence in the magnitudes of the coefficients 
X's in equations 1.0 and 1.1. 
2. Government encouraged expansion 
acreage through guaranteed price 
grams. 
3. The analysis indicates that if the 
equation was fitted to postwar lagged . 
a much 4igher percentage of accountable 
tion in rice acreage would be obtained. 
Additional Considerations 
1. Technological advances and . 
expedited progress toward expanding 
acreage once the decision to expand was 
2. Finally, available land and credit contrib-
uted to rapid expansion of rice acreage in the 
postwar period. 
Yield 
Very little attention was directed toward yield 
considerations in the rice industry during 1921-
40. However, in the latter part of the period, 
particularly after the Soil Conservation Act of 
1936, considerably more thought was devoted to 
improving soil productivity and subsequent in-
creases in crop yields. 
Considerable impetus was given to yield im-
provements after World War II. Incidentally, 
these improvements in yield have coincided with 
the widespread adoption of significant technolog-
ical advances and price stabilization accompany-
ing administered prices. These factors concern-
ing yield and non-acreage restrictions inevitably 
caused the supply curves for rice to shift to the 
right during 1946-54. 
Phenomenal progress has been made in rice 
yields since 1954, thereby partially compensating 
for reduction in rice acreage as determined by 
governmental action. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING YIELD 
The yield equation was fitted to the 1923-40 
data, Figure 3 to determine the extent to which 
prices preceding a crop year and time affected 
rice yields. Although physical and biological fac-
tors have considerable influence on plant yields, 
the importance of economic factors cannot be dis-
eounted. There always are production costs re-
ulting from insect pests, diseases, water control, 
fertilizer equipment, birds and various other fac-
tors. 
The statistical analysis relating yield to 1 
year and 2-year lagged prices and time, using 
only 1921-40 data, is: 
EQUATION 2.0 
Y = 18.918 - 1.068 Xl + .163 X2 + .302 X3 
(.7) (.7) (.04) 
Y = United States rice yields (cwt. per acre) 
Y I = one year lagged price (dol. per cwt.), de-
flated by the index of prices paid 
X2 = two year lagged prices (dol. per cwt.) , de-
flated by the index of prices paid 
X3 = time 
The statistical analysis relating yield to the 
variables using the 1923-40 data and the 
" D 410-l]IQ data, graphed in Figure 4, is: 
EQUATION 2.1 
Y = 21.294 - 1.622 Xl - .897 X2 + .221 X3 (.547) (.512) (.017) 
TS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
RICE YIELDS 
The analysis emphasizes the importance of 
in ascertaining the causes for changes in 
yields. Actually, equations 2.0 and 2.1 re-
little other than a directly related time trend. 
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Figure 3. Rice. rough: Yield per acre. actual. estimated 
and unexplained residuals. United States. 1923-40. 
The values of the following coefficients readily 
reflect the lack of interdependence of yield on rice 
prices prior to a particular crop year. Lagged 
prices during the 1921-40 period, as indicated by 
R2y.12 contributed more to the variation in yield 
than to the variation in acreage. In the latter 
period, however, the response of yield to lagged 
prices was zero. 
The following correlation coefficients related 
to the yield analysis: 
Values 1921-40 
Coefficients Values 1921-40 and 1946-54 
R2y.123 .867 .873 
R2y .23 .853 .828 
R2y .13 .876 .861 
R2y.12 .260 0 
r 2Y1.23 .099 .262 
r 2 y2.13 0 .086 
r 2y 3.12 .821 .873 
Sy.123 .678 .720 
The coefficients of Xl and X2, in equation 2.0, 
do not differ significantly from zero at the 10 
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Figure 4. Rice. rough: Yield per acre. actual. estimated 
and unexplained residuals. United States. 1923-40 and 1948-54. 
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percent probability level. Therefore, as shown 
by R2y.12a, in equation 2.0, the time variable Xa, 
accounted for nearly all the variation in yields. 
Time in equation 2.1 accounted for all of the vari-
ation in yields. The partial correlation (r2ya.12) 
verifies the values shown by R2 y.12a in equations 
2.0 and 2.l. 
The time variable usually is introduced in an 
analysis to determine the origin of continuous 
variation for which no data are included in the 
analysis. 
If the partial correlation r 2ya.12 fails to differ 
significantly from zero, time may be omitted as 
a variable. In this analysis, the effect of time 
on Y, holding the effect of Xl and X2 in equation 
2.0 constant is .921 and in equation 2.1, the value 
is .873. 
Time was introduced essentially into the yield 
equation to account for technological advances, 
fertilization, plant breeding and variety improve-
ments. 
The signs of Xl and X2 in equation 2.1, are 
not as expected, but the coefficients do differ 
slightly from zero at the 10 percent probability 
level. The sign of X2 in equation 2.0 and Xa in 
both yield equations have the expected signs. 
The negative signs, or an inverse relation-
ship, in both equations might be construed as a 
reflection of over-expansion in acreage and a sub-
sequent decrease in yield accompanying an in-
crease in the price 1 year, 2 years, or both, pre-
ceding a crop year. 
The inverse relationship of yield to lagged 
prices Xl and X2, as shown in equation 2.1, is 
improved when postwar data are used. 
In equation 2.0, the value of the coefficient of 
X2, (.163) is construed as follows: Y (yield) in-
creases (.163) (100 pounds) per acre for each 
unit increase (1 dollar per cwt.) in X2. The mag-
nitudes of the standard errors (SY.12a ) for the 
two periods were surprisingly close. 
Actual yield expressed as a percent of esti-
mated yield in the 1923-40 period, Table 3 reflects 
TABLE 3. RICE, ROUGH: ACTUAL YIELD IN RELATION TO 
Year 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
10 
ESTIMATED YIELD, 1923-40 . 
Actual yield as percentage 
of estimated yield 
95 
96 
96 
102 
102 
103 
104 
104 
101 
101 
97 
102 
100 
104 
97 
96 
101 
97 
the significance of time in explaining 
in yield. 
The unexplained yield residuals were 
appreciably when postwar data were used 
equation. This points up the importance of 
in explaining variations in yields. The· 
of administered prices, technological i 
and improvements in plant breeding are 
ted readily in the time variable. 
The value of R2 y.12, for yields in the 1 
period was 23 percent as compared with 1 
cent for acreage. However, with postwar 
included in this period the value of R2r 
yields is only a third as large as the 
value. 
The factors selected to explain 
yields during the 1921-40 period AUl>¥lU •• 'N 
the yield noticeably in 1923, 1924, 1925 and 
but underestimated the yield in 1928, 1929, 
and 1936. Since lagged prices accounted for 
26 percent of the variation in yields d . 
period, it is apparent that the analysis 
primarily a positive time trend. 
Yields are, for the most part, in 
lated to the index of prices paid by 
those factors used in the production 
Therefore, since the lagged prices Xl and 
deflated by the index of prices paid, the 
plained residuals reflected the level of 
tion costs. Time, however, which reflects 
pact of technological innovations and 
might perhaps dampen or accentuate 
traneous forces, depending on the 
value judgments and anticipations relative 
ternative resource uses. 
By noting the value of the partial 
r 2y2.3, which is zero, it can be deduced 
that, relative to prices, farmers were· 
more by the price immediately ",,,,",ro,,.-II1,,,,,, 
year than the other price period. This 
was improved very little by adding 
data to the 1921-40 data. Prewar 
not have been combined with postwar 
cause of the lack of homogeneity. However, 
were not enough postwar observations to 
separate analysis. 
It ordinarily is dangerous to "vi·¥"1'V11181 
predict on the basis of results obtained 
equation involving time as a variable. 
trend frequently will overshadQw econon~ 
tors in an analysis, and for this 
should be made to ascertain the ad 
using time as a variable. 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The principal implication in the yield 
is that time played the larger part in 
changes during the 1921-40 period. The 
ence of time and prices immediately p 
crop year probably is viewed by the 
potent factors attributable to yield 
but, as shown in Table 1, average annual 
varied but little in this period. 
Certain general conclusions follow, though. 
These are: 
1. That guaranteed government support prices 
prior to any crop year did not noticeably affect 
rice yields. 
2. That guaranteed current prices relative to 
prices paid by producers for input faetors had 
more influence than did preharvest prices. 
Additional Considerations 
1. That available resources for coping with 
physical and biological factors play a big part in 
yield variations. 
2. That producers will endeavor to maintain 
rice production levels, through increased yields, 
to compensate for acreage reductions under mar-
keting quotas and acreage allotment programs. 
THE RICE DEMAND EQUATIONS 
The economic forces of demand for agricul-
tural commodities are subject to constant change. 
Achieving effective results from statistical analy-
ses of demand for any commodity requires that 
the researcher exercise certain basic knowledge 
of economic and statistical methodology. 
The economic forces ascribable to the varia-
tion in the price-determined outlets in the rice in-
dustry did not, in most instances, give the esti-
mated variations expected. However, it is doubt-
ful whether the selection of any other factor or 
combination of factors could have improved ap-
preciably the results that were obtained from the 
demand equations, particularly in the 1921-40 
period. 
The price-determined outlets for the demand 
analyses are: per capita consumption, exports, 
storage and the world price. 
As was discussed under the Economic Frame-
work of Analyses, equations which have two or 
more variables that are determined simultane-
ously by the same set of economic forces should 
be solved simultaneously. This is particularly 
true if an unbiased estimate of the price elastic-
ity of demand is desired. Consumption, exports 
and storage are examples of such equations. 
Per Capita Consumption 
The per capita consumption of rice in the 
United States perhaps has varied less than has 
any other product used for human consumption. 
The per capita consumption of milled rice has 
Idom been more than .5 pound above or below 
ihe average of 5.4 pounds per person. Conse-
uently, the task of selecting economic forces 
cribable to the relatively small variation in con-
ption is very difficult. This could be a re-
It of such qualitative factors as consumer hab-
and customs. 
ATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING 
CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF RICE 
The per capita consumption equation was fit-
separately to data for two periods - to the 
921-40 data and then to the 1921-40 and 1946-
data. 
The actual and estimated values for these two 
periods are presented graphically in Figures 5 
and 6. 
Per capita disposable income, X 3, was chosen 
as a demand shifter. Factory earnings, X 2, was 
considered the most representative factor in ar-
riving at an estimate of the producer's market-
ing costs. The United States season average 
price, Xl, is an endogenous variable in that it 
might be determined simultaneously with con-
sumption by the same set of economic forces. 
The statistical analysis relating per capita con-
sumption data to the season average price, index 
of marketing costs and per capita income data 
for the 1921-40 period, is: 
EQUATION 3.0 
Y == 5.772 - .539 X l + .062 X2 + .00098 X3 (.4) (.04) (.003) 
Y = domestic per capita consumption of rice 
Xl = United States season average price 
(dol. per cwt.) 
X 2 = index of marketing costs (cents per 
hour) 
X3 = per capita income in dollars 
The statistical analysis relating per capita 
consumption of rice to the same variables as are 
in equation 3.0, using 1921-40 and 1946-54 data, 
is: 
EQUATION 3.1 
Y == 6.531 -- .392 Xl + .029 X 2 + .00245 X3 (.240) (.015) (.00098) 
RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
FOR PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
The consumption analysis reflects clearly the 
difficulty involved in ascertaining the causal re-
lationships for the variation in the average per 
capita consumption of rice. It does not seem 
plausible that factors other than Xli X2 and X3 
could contribute to any appreciable improvement 
in the results obtained. 
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Figure 5. Rice, rough: Per capita food consumption, 
actuaL estimated and unexplained residuals, United States, 
1921-40. 
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Figure 6. Rice, rough: Per capita food consumption, 
actual, estimated and unexplained residuals, United States, 
1921-40 and 1946-54. 
The following correlation coefficients relate 
to the consumption analysis: 
Values 1921-40 
Coefficients Values 1921-40 and 1946-54 
R 2y .123 .187 .294 
R 2y . 23 .150 .249 
R 2y .13 .093 .220 
R 2y . 12 .229 .151 
r 2Y1.23 .044 .060 
r 2y2.13 .104 .196 
r 2y3.12 0 .168 
S y. 123 .758 .692 
Income, for example, as indicated by the par-
tial correlation coefficient (r2y 3 .12) contributed no 
influence toward explaining consumption behav-
ior in 1921-40. However, income did show some 
improvement by including the 1946-54 data with 
the prewar data. Price and marketing costs, on 
the other hand, (R2y .12), indicated less influence 
toward explaining variation in consumption when 
postwar data were included in the analysis. 
Marketing costs had the greatest single in-
fluence in explaining variation in consumption 
(r2y 2. 13 ) during the prewar period. Actually, the 
composite influence (R2y . 123 ) was actually im-
proved for the prewar period when the income 
factor was omitted from the analysis. 
The coefficients of Xb X2 and X3 in equation 
3.0, do not differ significantly from zero at the 
10 percent probability level. The coefficient of 
X2 in equation 3.0 and 3.1, theoretically, has the 
wrong sign. However, whether the sign is posi-
tive or negative does not matter in equation 3.0, 
since the coefficient does not differ significantly 
from zero. 
In equation 3.1, the coefficient of Xl is ques-
tionable at the 10 percent level. The coefficient 
of X2 and X3 are valid with the exception of a 
positive sign for X 2 • The paradox of the sign 
of the coefficient of X2 lies in the fact that the 
X2 variable in the equation connotes marketing 
12 
costs, but vacillates with factory income. 
X 2 is perceived as representing only the 
of marketing costs, the sign of the 
logically would be negative, but if the 
mains aware of the basis of representa 
tory earnings), the sign logically should 
tive. 
The values of all correlation co 
the standard error of estimates, wi 
tion of R 2y .12, were improved COIISI'C ler~Ll>lr 
the data for the 9 postwar years were 
the analysis. The smaller value of 
postwar data were included can be 
increases in factory earnings, which are 
ed by X2 , not having as much influence 
sumption in the extremely high income 
ter the war as they did in the .... v ... ,p."' .... ".W'I!i 
income period prior to the war. 
that X? had less influence in eXI)lalmng' 
tions iIi' consumption is reflected by 
increased relatively little when the 
were included in the analysis. 
The actual per capita consumption of 
ing 1921-40 was expressed as a pprf'pnTJUNI 
estimated consumption. The values are 
Table 4. The estimated consumption 
obtained from equation 3.0. 
It is apparent that the variation in 
consumption, as shown by equation 3.0, 
more erratic at the beginning of the 
in 1929 and during the government 
1933, than was the case earlier in the 
Incidentally, Xb X2 and X3 in 
explained an average of 99.9 percent 
in consumption for the entire period. 
WEAKNESSES OF THE ANALYSIS ON 
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
The amount of variation in the per 
sumption of rice, as estimated by eq 
and 3.1, is not sufficient to ascribe any 
cance to the composite influence of XII Xt 
Since the value of R 2y .12 is larger when 
is omitted and that r 2Y1.23 and r2y2.13 
10 percent, respectively, it is apparent 
X? variable contributed more toward 
the variation in consumption. With 
included, the value of r 2y 2. 13 increased 
mately 100 percent} whereas r~Y 1.2:b 
about 50 percent. 
It would be dangerous to attach too 
portance to the influence of per capita 
the basis of the higher percentage 
plained by r 2y 3. 12 when postwar data 
ed. This could result from inter,cor:reJa 
some extent. That is, conditions 
dered favorable attributes of i 
war data included could have contri 
taneously to the variation in cOllsump'tiCi 
logical reason why per capita income 
have exerted as much influence w 
data were included, is that it contrl 
toward explaining the variation in 
in the prewar period. 
e 
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a 
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The analysis would have probably been im-
proved if Xl had been adj usted by the index of 
prices paid by farmers. Too, the analysis might 
have reflected greater influence in explaining the 
variation if the first differences of logarithms 
had been used. First differences are particularly 
u eful when extreme values are involved as was 
the case when postwar vaJues were inCluded in 
the prewar values. 
In Table 4, there were 2 years, 1921 and 1933, 
for which the values obtained for consumption by 
equation 3.0 were considerably ov~restimated, but 
the values obtained in 1927, 1932, 1934 and 1936 
were considerably. underestimated. There was a 
drastic slump in prices received by farmers in 
1921. These prices dropped to the second lowest 
on record in 1933. The lowest index of prices re-
eeived was the 1932 value of 65. 
The estimated values obtained by equation 3.0 
were below actual consumption figures for the 
years in which prices received were below the 
level of the preceding year. However, the situa-
tion was just the reverse in 1934 and 1936. Gov-
emment programs could have altered the normal 
eourse of economic forces in the rice industry 
during those years. 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
It would be in error to deduce from the mag-
nitude of the regression coefficients that prices 
Xl) affected consumption considerably more 
n did marketing costs (X2 ). The validity 
st be established by a test of significance at a 
ified level and by the magnitude of the par-
I correlation coefficient. 
There appeared to be less disturbance in the 
consumption function when using postwar than 
hen using prewar data. The smaller disturb-
is, to some extent, reflected in the values of 
123· 
In examining the change in the values of 
13 for the two periods, and at the same time 
. g the change in r 2y 1. 23 , it might be inferred 
t per capita income, X i"!' enhanced appreciably 
level of explicable variation in rice consump-
after World War II. In reality, the income 
ession coefficient in equation 3.1 did not dif-
significantly from zero at the 5 percent prob-
• 'ty level and barely did differ from zero at 
10 percent level. 
Certain general conclusions follow, though. 
are: 
1. That marketing costs affected the varia-
in consumption more in the prewar than in 
postwar period. 
2. That income showed evidence of greater in-
on consumption variation in the postwar 
8. That the season average price had very lit-
influence on domestic consumption of rice by 
population as a whole in the United States. 
was a result perhaps of the very low price 
of demand for rice. 
4. That government support prices did not 
contribute to any change in the variation of per 
capita consumption of rice. 
Other Considerations 
1. The results of the consumption analysis 
would, perhaps, be more revealing and of greater 
consequence if geographical and ethnological con-
siderations were incorporated into the analysis. 
Factors that induce a Midwestern consumer to 
purchase rice are not necessarily relevant in ex-
plaining the consumption of rice by a consumer 
in the South. 
2. That increases in aggregate consumption 
will be realized through population increases 
rather than from increases in per capita con-
sumption. 
Exports 
Rice exports have played a very vital role in 
the relatively prosperous economy that has pre-
vailed in the rice industry since the beginning of 
World War II. 
Exports constituted about 50 percent of total 
disposition of United States rice stocks during 
1940-54. Producers have relied heavily in recent 
years on foreign imports of United States rice in 
formulating production decisions. What the fu-
ture holds in store relative to foreign outlets for 
United States rice is anyone's guess. 
The rate of increase in the total consumption 
of rice roughly parallels the rate of increase in 
population. Consequently, foreign rice outlets 
must continue to absorb a large percentage of 
United States rice supplies if the high level of 
production that prevailed in recent years is main-
tained. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING EXPORTS 
The export equation was fitted only to the 
1921-40 data. These data are presented graph-
ically in Figure 7. Since Japanese rice prices 
TABLE 4. RICE, ROUGH: PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN 
RELATION TO ESTIMATED CONSUMPTION, 1921.40 
Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Actual consumption as percentage 
of estimated consumption 
86 
101 
98 
103 
101 
104 
110 
95 
94 
101 
92 
112 
85 
US 
94 
114 
102 
93 
101 
97 
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were not available after 1941, the export equa-
tion was fitted only to the 1921-40 data. The ex-
port equation involves only one independent var-
iable. The independent variable represents the 
average annual price differential between the 
Japanese and the United States rice prices. The 
Japanese rice price at Yokohama was used as the 
world price in equation 6.0. The difference be-
tween Japanese rice prices and United States do-
mestic prices was considered to be the most de-
cisive single economic factor in governing the 
rate of export movements into foreign markets. 
The reason for choosing the Japanese price was 
that Japan was the heaviest importer of foreign 
rice supplies. 
The statistical analysis relating exports to the 
annual price differences between the World and 
United States prices, using 1921-40 data, is: 
EQUATION 4.0 
Y == 7,959.534 + 494.855 Xl 
(550.414) 
Y == United States exports (1,000 ewt.) 
Xl == Japanese rice price minus the sum of 
the United States price, Japanese tariffs 
and ocean freight charges. 
RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
FOR RICE EXPORTS 
The difference between Japanese and United 
States rice prices did not give satisfactory results 
in explaining the variation in United States rice 
exports. There was some doubt as to the accu-
racy of Japanese price data. Considerable diffi-
culty also was encountered in obtaining Japanese 
tariffs and ocean freight rates. 
If the demand for United States rice abroad 
is strong enough, as it was immediately after 
W orId War II, some rice will be exported irre-
spective of the differential between the World 
and United States prices. However, as the avail-
able foreign supply approaches the state of only 
slight disequilibrium relative to the demand in 
those countries, only then will the price differ-
THOUS. CWT. 
10pOO~~--~~---+~-+--------+-~~~~ 
6pOO~----4--H~------~--~--~~----~ 
4P~~'2LO~~L-LI9~2- 5L-~~1-9~30~~~-19~3-5·~~~19~40 
'0 3pO 
1,50 10 
0 
-1,50 0 
-3pO 0 
I 
I 
I I 
J 
UNEXPLAINED RESIDUALS -
I (T HOUS. C WT. l 
I I I I I I I I 
.4 447 
Figure 7. Rice, rough: Exports, actual. estimated and 
unexplained residuals, United States, 1921-40. 
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entia I be a decisive factor in determining 
quantity imported. This however, assumes 
that no differentation is made between rice 
ities which determines whether the outlet 
quality market or a price market and (2) 
the world market demand is more elastic 
the United States domestic market demand. 
sequently, equation 4.0 is designed primarily 
explain export movements of rice under 
tions which are nurtured and governed by 
law of supply and demand. 
It would have been interesting to have 
served the changes in results for the export 
tion if the 1946-54 data had been av 
The following correlation coefficients 
the export analysis: 
Coefficients Values 1921-40 
r 2Yl .407 
Syl 2,109.517 
About 41 percent of the variation in 
was attributed to Xl' The sign of the 
coefficient is correct since there is extlectlecl, 
be a direct correlation between increases in 
ports and increases in the magnitudes of 
differentials. This, however, is based on 
itive excesses of Japanese rice prices over 
States prices. 
The coefficient of Xl does not differ 
cantly from zero even at the 30 percent 
ity level. The equation in the main rev 
ally nothing as to the true cause of varia 
United States exports. In reality, it would be 
difficult to determine whether Xl is the 
the effect of variation in exports. The v 
the contention is further attested by the 
tude of Sy.l ' 
Actual exports were expressed as a 
age of estimated exports, Table 5. The 
were extremely large in certain years as a 
of extremely large standard errors in the 
mates. With the exception of 1927, 1931 
1932, the estimated exports were ".." .. "",'1\ .... 
out of line. 
In view of the lack of continuity of 
relative to prosperous and depression 
three closely estimated export years 
charged off to chance factors or riA'''''..,'''''' ..... 
errors. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE ANALYSIS ON 
The results of the rice export analysis 
dicative of the prevalence of errors in 
port data or the inherent weakness in 
difference factor in explaining the u",.,,,",I\W!I, 
If the Japanese price data are authentic 
the import tariffs and ocean freight rates 
curate, then the weakness obviously lies in 
irrelevancy or inadequacy of Xl in exp . . 
variation ' in rice exports. 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The standard error of estimate might 
reader to imply that the weakness in the 
analysis is ascribable to inaccuracies in 
port data. On the other hand, the Japanese price 
could, for the most part, be irrelevant in explain-
ing the variation in rice exports during 1921-40. 
In reality, upon reviewing the history of exports 
during this period, most of the United States rice 
exports went to Cuba and Puerto Rico except for 
everal years during the 1920's, at which time 
Japan did receive a relativeJy large percentage of 
United States exports. 
Exports were not affected directly by govern-
ment price programs during the period covered 
by the analysis. The implication is that by hav-
ing a guaranteed price for rice, producers were 
encouraged to produce enough rice to satisfy the 
strong foreign demand for rice which prevailed 
and would have prevailed in spite of government 
price programs. 
It is believed that a two-price program for 
rice would increase United States exports, but 
uch a program will inevitably be plagued with 
international political repercussions. In the ab-
sence of a two-price rice program, the domestic 
price would have to be maintained at prevailing 
world price levels to expect a reasonable flow of 
rice through available export channels. Diffi-
culty again will be encountered under this type 
of governmental action in as much as repercus-
ions would perhaps emanate from domestic pro-
ducers. 
Certain general conclusions follow, though. 
These are: 
1. That if Japanese data were available for 
the postwar period, Xl would be more relevant 
in explaining the variation in exports. 
2. That a different world price for the pre-
war period would improve the analysis. 
3. That if an index of foreign production 
be developed, it would contribute greatly 
improving the analysis. 
Considerations 
If there are no wars, wide3pread drouths or 
and disease epidemics in the future to dis-
rice production within principal rice pro-
areas, United States rice exports could be 
imperiled. 
Serious consideration should be directed to-
ascertaining what the export market po-
likely will be prior to planning needed 
Storage 
The quantity of rice that goes into storage 
primarily on the following considera-
: (1) what the price is likely to be at some 
re date and the extent to which the producer 
satisfied with the prevailing market price, (2) 
the expected price increment is more than suf-
to offset storage costs, (3) a vailability of 
faciliti es, (4) credit resources, (5) alter-
use of available funds and (6) the specu-
aspects of storage through time. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING STORAGE 
The economic implications of rice storage are 
not quite as complex and difficult to reconcile as 
the other concepts considered in this study. An 
analysis on rice storage was completed using the 
1921-40 and 1946-54 data. The storage equation 
was fitted to the 1921-40 data and also to the 
1921-40 and 1946-54 data. The results obtained 
with the storage equation for the two time per-
iods are graphically presented in Figures 8 and 
9. 
The storage equation involved only two vari-
ables. The single independent variable was the 
deflated United States season average price. The 
price variable was deflated by the all-commodi-
ties price index. 
The statistical analysis relating storage to de-
flated farm rice prices, using 1921-40 data, is: 
EQUATION 5.0 
Y = 5,633.371 - 1,680.769 Xl 
(585.676) 
Y = United States rice storage (1,000 cwt.) 
Xl = deflated United States season average 
price (dols. per cwt.) 
The statistical analysis relating the storage 
equation to the same variable as in equation 5.0, 
using the 1921-40 and 1946-54 data, is: 
EQUATION 5.1 
Y = 2,753.644 + 88.320 Xl 
(1,798.233 ) 
RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
FOR RICE STORAGE 
The demand for rice storage is governed by 
the amount of profit expected from holding the 
grain for some future sale. 
The coefficient of Xl in equation 5.0 has the 
expected sign and differs significantly from zero. 
However, the standard error of the regression co-
efficient should be smaller. 
TABLE 5. RICE, ROUGH: ACTUAL EXPORTS IN RELATION 
TO ESTIMATED EXPORTS, 1921-40 
Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Actual exports as percentage 
of estimated exports 
133 
106 
87 
61 
49 
96 
100 
124 
107 
108 
101 
102 
79 
87 
71 
80 
124 
121 
122 
142 
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Figure S. Rice, rough: Storage. actual. estimated and 
unexplained residuals, United States, 1921-40. 
Assuming that storage facilities were avail-
able during 1921-40, it appears logical that the 
quantity stored would be related inversely to a 
unit change in Xl' That is to say, if the price 
changed up or down $1.00 per hundredweight, 
the quantity available for sale or storage, respec-
tively, would be about 1.7 million hundredweight. 
Equation 5.1, which included 9 postwar years' 
data, is of no consequence. The coefficient of Xl 
does not differ significantly from zero, even at 
the 99 percent probability level. 
The following correlation coefficients relate 
to the storage analysis: 
Values 1921-40 
Coefficients Values 1921-40 and 1946-54 
r 2Yl .325 .009 
SYi 864.802 5,416.469 
The standard error of estimates is considered 
fairly large in view of the quantities available for 
storage during the prewar period. The coeffi-
cient of determination is not of sufficient magni-
tude to explain the behavior pattern of storage 
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Figure 9. Rice, rough: Storage, actual. estimated and 
unexplained residuals, United States, 1921-40 and 1946-54. 
16 
by deflated price changes. Price chang 
dicated by r 2Yl accounted for roughly 
of the variation in storage. 
Unexplained residuals in Figure 9 
flect the futility of attempting to 
quantities available for storage by price 
during the postwar period. 
Actual storage was expressed as a 
of estimated storage in Table 6. As i 
the results obtained, Xl overestimated 
ably the quantities available for storage 
of the earlier prewar years with the 
1926 and 1927. 
The advent of new government 
grams in 1933, 1936 and 1938 could, 
caused the very noticeably underestima 
tities available for storage. The abrupt 
in the percentage roughly parallel the 
changes in actual quantities available for 
in Figure 9. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE ANALYSIS ON 
Actual carryover of rice supplies was 
represent storage in equations 5.0 and 
storage data used were on a rough rice 
in reality, these data represent seed 
over. The other portion of total 
milled rice. In attributing the vari 
age to the deflated price, pa VA" ......... " 
postwar period, certain price relatIo:nStlllPil 
have been considered for storage da 
and 1954. In 1951, the support price 
the season average price, thus 
true forces of supply and demand i 
the free market price. The same s 
true for the 1954 prices. Also in 1954, 
tity of rice carryover was out of 
the carryover recorded for the 
Other factors, such as an index of 
duction and the world price, would have 
improved the results of the storage 
Storage facilities during 1921-40 
limited compared with the postwar 
large percentage of storage facilities in 
war period were government-owned 
warehouses. However, a greater 
the prewar production of rice wen 
than was the case during 1946-53. 
of rice going into carryover stocks in 
about equal to the combined carryover 
preceding years used in the analysis. 
foreign demand for United States rice 
1954 was the principal factor in 
the smaller percentage of rice carryove 
and after the war. 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The government support price 
rice affected rice production in 
ways: (1) rice was produced n.",ma""n 
guaranteed price and not necessarily 
tic and export market needs and (2) 
pansion in the rice acreage eventually 
carryover stocks in Commodity Credit 
tion warehouses, beginning with the 
Government programs designed to maintain 
high support prices resulted in rapid increases in 
rice acreage during and after the war. However, 
accompanying the rapid expansion in the pro-
duction of rice was an increasingly strong foreign 
demand. It was not until 1954 that the United 
States total production of rice, minus normal do-
mestic requirements, was noticeably in excess of 
the quantity needed to satisfy export needs. 
Certain general conclusions follow, though. 
These are: 
1. That domestic prices alone are insufficient 
to account for variations in rice storage. 
2. That the impact of government programs 
on quantities going into storage was offset by an 
abnormally strong foreign demand until 1954. 
3. That support prices since 1953 contributed 
to the increasing quantities of rice moving into 
Commodity Credit Corporation warehouses. Pub-
lic Law 480 and school lunch programs have al-
leviated the burden of excessive rice storage 
tocks in recent years. 
World Prices 
Japan imports a larger quantity of rice for 
home consumption than any other country in the 
world. The average annual price at Yokohama 
was, therefore, used in equation 6.0 to represent 
the world market price for all rice that enters 
international trade. 
Japan will perhaps never be in a position to 
produce enough rice in anyone year to satisfy 
her domestic requirements. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING WORLD PRICES 
Data for the world price equation were avail-
able only for the 1921-40 period. Actual prices 
and estimated prices are illustrated graphically 
in Figure 10. Since rice prices in Japan were 
placed under the auspices of the Japanese govern-
ment in 1942, the nine postwar years (1946-54) 
uld not be included in the analysis. 
Residual prices illustrated in Figure 10 were 
Dot too far out of line except for the depression 
ear 1932. The depressed farm price conditions 
the United States had not been reflected wholly 
rhaps, in the world rice market in 1932. The 
rious economic conditions prevailing in this 
untry probably caused this extreme difference 
the two prices. 
The statistical analysis relating world prices 
world rice supplies, statist index and time, us-
only the 1921-40 data, is: 
EQUATION 6.0 
Y = .436 + .0000074 Xl + .024 X2 - .140 X3 
(.000007) (.006) (.04) 
Y = Japanese rice prices (dols. per cwt.) 
Xl = supply of rice entering world trade 
(1,000 cwt.) 
X2 = statist index 
Xs=time 
RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
FOR WORLD RICE PRICES 
Time, total supply of rice entering interna-
tional trade and the statist index (originally the 
United Kingdom index) were considered the best 
combination of variables to determine the varia-
tion in world prices. 
The statist index was used as a demand shif-
ter and time was used to account for the dynamic 
growth of population. 
The following correlation coefficients relate 
to the world price analysis: 
Coefficients Values 1921-40 
R 2y.123 .796 
R 2y .23 .795 
R 2y .12 .639 
R 2y.13 .598 
r 2Y1.23 .005 
r 2y 2.l3 .493 
r 2y 3.l2 .436 
S y.123 .568 
The coefficient of Xl has the wrong sign, but 
does not differ significantly from zero and, for 
that reason, warrants no explanation. 
Variation in the world price of rice was af-
fected more during this period by the statist in-
dex than by the composite influence of the other 
two variables. As indicated by the value of r 2y 2.l3 , 
X 2 accounted for about half of the total variation 
in prices attributable to the three independent 
variables. During the entire period, about two-
thirds of the observed price values fell within 57 
cents of $3.86. 
Time was only 6 percent less effective in ex-
plaining variations in the price than was the sta-
tist index. Time, in equation 6.0, indicated the 
presence of a negative trend during the period. 
Depressed economic conditions and a drop in the 
general level of prices during the period, per-
haps, caused the negative time trend. The statist 
index has the correct sign and indicates that, 
TABLE 6. RICE, ROUGH: ACTUAL STORAGE IN RELATION 
TO ESTIMATED STORAGE, 1921-40 
Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Actual storage as percentage 
of estimated storage 
76 
103 
52 
30 
70 
136 
121 
82 
75 
73 
104 
63 
166 
44 
57 
138 
90 
142 
198 
137 
11 
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Figure 10. World price, actual. estimated and unex-
plained residuals, United States, 1921-40. 
with a unit change in the index, the price changed 
approximately 2 cents in the same direction. 
World rice prices were expressed as percent-
ages of estimated prices in Table 7. Estimated 
prices were considerably in excess of actual prices 
in 1932 and 1933. Rice prices were noticeably 
underestimated in 1931, 1937 and 1938. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE ANALYSIS ON PRICES 
In using the price data for 1921-40, several 
shortcomings are encountered relative to the pro-
cess of obtaining reliable results from the price 
equation. For example, the variables are affect-
ed by international trade, many different forms 
of financial structures, different types 'of gov-
ernments and internal economies. It is difficult 
to reconcile the total lack of influence of Xl in 
explaining the variation in prices. Data used 
for the Xl variable, however, represent only 4 to 
5 percent of the world production of rice entering 
international trade. 
Rice prices were not affected directly by gov-
ernment programs during 1921-40. There was 
no support price program for rice until 1941 and 
no acreage allotments and marketing quotas un-
til the 1955 rice crop. 
An analysis was not made without time as a 
variable to ascertain whether a systematic varia-
tion of residuals through time was evident. 
INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS 
It often is difficult to interpret the magni-
tudes of coefficients without first converting to 
elasticities. Inferentially, the negative time trend 
was, perhaps, a reflection of the declining level 
of the agricultural industry, as well as the ag-
gregate economy of this country during a num-
ber of years, particularly in the 1930's. 
Total supplies of rice entering world trade had 
no influence on prices, as indicated by r2Y1.23 and 
substantiated by the Nt" test. This certainly im-
plies that rice prices in the world market are con-
trolled primarly by international trade agree-
ments, bartering agreements and governmental 
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policies of the importing and exporting 
In reality, the influence of X2 in eq 
which represents directly a group of 
principal commodities that flow through 
market channels, further strengthens the 
ence. That is, rice price levels are 
more by the status of the other connm<><iiti 
the world market than by the separate 
actual rice supplies on the price. This 
haps, reflect the economic and poli . 
of the countries engaged in rice .UUIIJV"'"", 
haps a particular Asian country has no 
tive choice in her bartering agreements 
accept rice in exchange for the product 
ports. 
Certain general conclusions follow, 
These are: 
1. That the Japanese price (world 
not exactly relevant for 1921-40 for use in 
tion 4.0. 
2. That time would show a positive 
postwar data for the Japanese prices were 
able. 
3. That prices are influenced more by 
rice production than by all rice supplies 
tered international trade. 
4. That the Japanese price was not 
by United States government farm 
the 1930's. 
5. That the Japanese price might not 
to world market rice supplies in the same 
as would another rice-importing country. 
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES 
In the model analyses, no particular 
eration was given to rough rice prices 
Prices were considered only as dv""" """U111 
dogenous variables and not as a dete:rmilM 
dogenous variable. 
Interrelationships of rice prices, 
and possible effects of government 
TABLE 7. WORLD PRICES IN RELATION TO 
PRICES, 1921-40 
Year Actual of 
1921 89 
1922 99 
1923 92 
1924 99 
1925 111 
1926 114 
1927 101 
1928 98 
1929 113 
1930 112 
1931 120 
1932 53 
1933 78 
1934 92 
1935 107 
1936 98 
1937 118 
1938 123 
1939 88 
1940 98 
grams are difficult to understand fully unless 
they are viewed frequently through several types 
of statistical approaches. Methods of disposing 
of available supplies of rice and the prices re-
ceived vitally concern every producer. 
Price and Disposition 
The most discernible goal of any producer of 
an agricultural commodity is an a vailable mar-
ket for his product and a price that will guar-
anteed a reasonable return (a specified unit price 
in excess of unit cost) on his investment. In this 
dichotomy of production is nurtured, in the mind 
of the producer, the rationale for the time and 
the place to sell hIs product. In Table 8, is shown 
the percentage that the domestic market disap-
pearance and the combination of the domestic and 
foreign outlets for rice is of the total United 
States supply. 
It is evident from the percentages in columns 
1 and 2, Table 8, that exports have been the prin-
cipal bulwark against rice price and income in-
tability. Carryover is reflected in the difference 
between the percentage given in column 3 and a 
100 percent. During 1938-55, the average an-
nual amount of the United States production of 
rice moving through foreign markets was roughly 
50 percent. The annual average amount that was 
moved through domestic market channels from 
1921-55 was 66 percent, while the average for 
foreign outlets was only 24 percent. This certain-
ly reflects in recent years the growing importance 
of foreign markets for United States rice. This 
assumes, of course, the continued postwar rate of 
production and the absence of government acre-
age restrictions. 
Percentages shown in Table 8, illustrate the 
'gnificance of rice exports in maintaining prices 
received by producers. This, in effect, depicts a 
higher price elasticity of demand for rice in the 
world market, as compared with the domestic 
market. 
Production and Price Variations Before and 
During Government Programs 
Rice was not added to the list of basic agri-
eultural commodities until 1941. However, the 
934-40 period was considered in view of the pos-
ible indirect effects of government programs in 
e rice industry. 
In Table 9, the first column of percentages 
• tho e based on the variations from the mean 
ue of the series and in the other column are 
own year-to-year variations. 
In each instance, year-to-year variation was 
nsiderably greater because the true value of 
h production and price magnitude was reflect-
, When the percentages were based on the 
ean value of the series, extreme values are par-
lly hidden in years of low variation. 
During 1920-33, when there were no support 
'ce programs, prices varied about three times 
re than production, based on the average value 
TABLE 8, RICE, ROUGH: UNITED STATES DISAPPEARANCE 
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL SUPPLY, 1921-55 
Domestic Domestic 
disappearance disappearance Season 
Year as percentage plus exports average 
of as percentage price, 
total supply of $ per cwt. total supply 
1921 54 94 2.18 
1922 63 90 2.19 
1923 '76 96 2.49 
1924 87 98 2.99 
1925 87 92 3.30 
1926 69 92 2.51 
1927 68 89 2.02 
1928 66 93 2.03 
1929 73 94 2.22 
1930 74 94 1.74 
1931 68 87 1.08 
1932 78 91 .93 
1933 78 87 1.73 
1934 87 96 1.76 
1935 87 94 1.60 
1936 83 86 1.85 
1937 73 89 1.46 
1938 68 85 1.42 
1939 67 82 1.62 
1940 71 90 1.80 
1941 73 98 3.01 
1942 68 92 3.61 
1943 70 94 3.96 
1944 63 95 3.93 
1945 61 96 3.98 
1946 61 98 5.00 
1947 61 98 5.97 
1948 57 94 4.88 
1949 54 92 4.10 
1950 59 90 5.09 
1951 48 96 4.82 
1952 48 97 5.87 
1953 46 86 5.19 
1954 40 61 4.57 
1955 36 56 4.53 
TABLE 9. CRITERION OF STABILITY RELATIVE TO RICE 
PRODUCTION AND PRICES BEFORE AND DURING GOV-
ERNMENT SUPPORT PROGRAMS, 1920-541 
Periods Variation from the mean Variation from 
of the series year-to-year . 
- - - - -
Percent - -
~U ~(Ut - Ut-1 ) 
1920-33 - = 10.9 
-
88.7 
Mu M(Ut - Ut- l ) 
~U ~(Ut - Ut- l) 
1934-40 -= 12.9 = 124.4 
Mu M(Ut - Ut- l ) 
~U ~(ut - Ut-1 ) 
1941-54 -= 25.6 
-
69.9 
Mu M(Ut - Ut-l ) 
~S ~(St - St- l) 
1920-33 -= 30.9 
-
"66.9 
Ms M(St - St- l) 
~S ~(St - St- l) 
1934-40 9.4 = 63.6 Ms M(St - St-l) 
~S ~(St - St- l) 
1941-54 -= 17.9 
-
52.7 
Ms M(St - St- l ) 
It = years. 
u = United States production. 
s = season average price. 
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in each case, but varied about 21 percent less 
when based on year-to-year variations. 
During 1941-54, it is evident from the results 
obtained through both bases of reckoning that 
government support price programs tended to 
stabilize rice prices but not rice production. 
Rice Prices in Relation to Potato and 
Wheat Prices 
Very few agricultural commodities move free-
ly through price determined outlets unhampered 
by competitive commodities. Rice, in some in-
stances, particularly price-wise and place-wise, 
could be affected significantly by wheat and po-
tatoes. In view of this possibility, a few obser-
vations relative to price comparisons were con-
sidered. 
Seasonal average prices for rice, potatoes and 
wheat during 1921-55, as shown in Table 10, 
were fairly close during 1921-45. However, dur-
ing 1946-55, rice and wheat prices were higher 
than potato prices on the per bushel basis, with 
rice averaging 5 cents higher than wheat prices. 
This type of behavior is indicative of a favorable 
domestic and particularly foreign markets for 
rice and wheat immediately after World War II. 
The shift from the consumption of starchy foods 
TABLE 10. SEASON AVERAGE PRICE PER BUSHEL RE-
CEIVED BY FARMERS FOR RICE, POTATOES AND WHEAT. 
1921-54 
Season average price per bushel received 
Year by farmers 
Rice Potatoes Wheat 
Dollars 
1921 .98 1.13 1.03 
1922 .98 .66 .97 
li23 1.12 . 92 .93 
1924 1.34 .69 1.25 
1925 1.48 1.70 1.44 
1926 1.13 1.31 1.22 
1927 .91 1.02 1.19 
1928 .91 .52 1.00 
1929 1.00 1.32 1.04 
1930 .78 .91 .67 
1931 .49 .46 .39 
1932 .42 .38 .38 
1933 .78 .82 .74 
1934 .79 .45 .85 
1005 .72 .59 .83 
1936 .83 1.14 1.03 
1937 .66 .53 .96 
1938 .64 .56 .56 
1939 .73 .69 .69 
1940 .81 .53 .68 
1941 1.35 .79 .94 
1942 1.62 1.14 1.10 
1943 1.78 1.28 1.36 
1944 1.77 1.47 1.41 
1945 1.79 1.40 1.50 
1946 2.25 1.20 1.91 
1947 2.69 1.61 2.29 
1948 2.20 1.53 1.99 
1949 1.84 1.28 1.88 
1950 2.29 .92 2.00 
1951 2.17 1.63 2.11 
1952 2.64 1.96 2.09 
1953 2.34 .80 2.04 
1954 2.05 1.30 2.13 
1955 2.04 .94 1.99 
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to a greater per capita consumption of 
fruits and vegetables contributed to this 
ence in wheat and rice prices after 1945. 
difference was, perhaps, a result of a high 
of employment and income. Too, potato 
would be expected to vary more than 
wheat prices since potatoes do not have the 
tional advantage of foreign markets. 
Wheat and potatoes were chosen to 
with rice since potatoes were considered 
more competitive food to rice on the 
market than any other agricultural 
Wheat, on the other hand, was con . 
in greater competition with rice for f 
world market than any other food connm()dltl 
The coefficients of variation for rice, 
and wheat prices during 1921-45 were 38, 
31 percent, respectively. Potato prices 
about 10 percent more than wheat p . 
varied fairly close to rice prices. During 
45, rice and potatoes were closer substitute 
than were they during 1946-54. During 
however, the domestic market and Cuba 
a considerable portion of the United 
duction of rice. 
The coefficients of variation based on 
erage price of rice, potatoes and wheat 
1946-54 were 11, 26 and 5 percent, 
These percentages point up the ins 
tato prices relative to rice and wheat p 
ing this period. Wheat and rice were 
ernment control programs during this 
Rice was not under acreage allotments 
keting quotas until 1955. Wheat, 
under acreage restrictions in 1950 and 1 
eign demand conceivably caused grea 
tion in rice prices as a result of the d 
of rice production in the principal rice 
areas of Asia . 
Table 10 shows the price pattern for 
tatoes and wheat during 1921-55. It is 
from the table that rice and wheat . 
noticeably higher than potato prices with 
ception of 1952, when the average price 
tatoes was the highest during the 35-year 
There was a very short potato crop in 
During 1947-54, the coefficient of 
showed that the difference between the 
ket price and the support price varied 
percent from the averages of the two 
ing this 8-year period. The support price 
rived from the relation between the total 
normal supply. Consequently, the high 
age variation between the two prices is 
of a disproportionate relationship 
production and demand for rice each year 
pared with the preceding year. 
DEFLATED PRICES 
The season average prices of rice, 
and wheat, as shown in Table 11, were 
by the all-commodities index to place 
equal purchasing power basis with 
tural commodities. This deflation indo 
stability in rice prices relative to other 
turaI commodities than was true for potatoes and 
wheat. Potato prices were much more erratic 
than were rice and wheat prices. This, again, 
was, perhaps, a result of potatoes having only a 
domestic market outlet. 
As indicated in Table 11, rice prices during 
the War years were considerably above wheat 
and potato prices as a result of the government 
encouraging increased rice production to satisfy 
domestic, military and foreign demand. 
Demand Relationships of Rice 
and Potatoes 
Regression analyses, covering three different 
time periods, were used to determine to what ex-
tent, if any, rice substituted for or was comple-
mentary to potatoes. 
Equation 7.0 and the statistical results during 
1921-40 are: 
EQUATION 7.0 
Y = 1.984 - 5.775 Xl 
(2.837) 
Y = ratio of rice prices to potato prices 
Xl = ratio of rice supplies to potato supplies 
Statistical coefficients relati?g to the analy-
Type of 
Coefficients Values relationship 
r - .433 
Sy .329 
tIS 2.036 
l i b - .173 substitutes 
In equations 7.0, 8.0 and 9.0, the price ratios 
re used as dependent variables and supply ra-
as independent variables. The regression 
......... .f'.f!';in.;·ents are, therefore, cross price flexibili-
The sign also is reversed - negative signs 
te substitutabilty and the larger the coeffi-
the higher is the degree of substitutability. 
same conditions are true in the case of com-
rity except for a positive sign. 
As indicated by the magnitude of the recip-
of b, there was only a small degree of sub-
." ... , ... .." ... ty of rice for potatoes in this period. 
Equation 8.0 and the statistical results during 
are: 
EQUATION 8.0 
Y = .973 + 2.175 Xl 
(1.074) 
coefficients relating to the analy-
Type of 
Values relationship 
r .337 
Sy .455 
t32 2.025 
l i b .460 complements 
When data for the 14 war and postwar years 
included with prewar data, the relationship 
to a higher degree of complementarity. 
ilt" value with 32 degrees of freedom was 
about the same as for equation 7.0. The standard 
error of estimate (Sy) was about .1 point larger. 
The simple correlation coefficient, however, was 
slightly smaller. 
Equation 9.0, and the statistical results dur-
ing 1941-54 are: 
EQUATION 9.0 
Y = 1.408 + 1.034 Xl 
(1.620) 
Statistical coefficients relating to the analy-
sis: 
Coefficients Values 
.181 
.502 
.638 
.978 
Type .of 
relationship 
r 
Sy 
tl2 
l i b complements 
Rice was under support price programs in 
every year of this period and potatoes were dur-
ing 1941-49. As indicated by the magnitude of 
the regression coefficient, the price ratio varied 
less per unit change in the supply ratio during 
the support price period than did they during the 
other two periods. If rice and potatoes were per-
fect substitutes, their price ratios would be a con-
stant. 
TABLE 11. SEASON AVERAGE PRICE PER BUSHEL RE-
CEIVED BY FARMERS FOR RICE, POTATOES AND WHEAT 
(DEFLATED BY ALL COMMODITIES INDEX), 1921-1955 
Year 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
Season average price per bushel received 
by farmers (deflated) for 
Rice Potatoes Wheat 
Dollars 
.81 .93 .85 
.82 .55 .81 
.90 .74 .74 
1.10 .57 1.03 
1.15 1.32 1.12 
.91 1.06 .98 
.77 .86 1.01 
.76 .43 .83 
.85 1.12 .88 
.73 .85 .62 
.54 .51 .43 
.52 .47 .47 
.95 1.00 .90 
.85 .48 .91 
.72 .59 .84 
.83 1.14 1.03 
.62 .49 .90 
.66 .57 .57 
.76 .72 .72 
.83 .54 .70 
1.24 .73 .87 
1.32 .93 .90 
1.39 1.00 1.06 
1.37 1.14 1.09 
1.36 1.07 1.14 
1.50 .80 1.27 
1.46 .88 1.24 
1.10 .77 1.00 
.97 .68 .99 
1.16 .48 1.02 
.99 .74 .96 
1.24 .92 .98 
1.11 .38 .97 
.97 .62 1.01 
.96 .44 .94 
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It is apparent that the price ratios varied less 
under government price programs than did they 
before the War. However, since the magnitudes 
of l i b are so small, it is impossible to determine 
the true demand relationship. The "t" values 
further substantiate this contention. The re-
gression coefficients, nevertheless, depict more 
variable supply ratios under government price 
programs than was the case with price ratios. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE ANALYSIS ON 
DEMAND RELATIONSHIPS 
Demand relationships should be determined 
under conditions of free market prices. Artific-
ial prices do not constitute a valid criterion of 
demand relationships. The analysis should have 
excluded the period after potatoes were dropped 
from the list of support price commodities. How-
ever, to have done so, would have reduced the de-
grees of freedoms below the number necessary to 
obtain valid results. 
The standard error of estimates (Sy) increas-
ed more when data for price support years were 
included. The regression coefficients in equa-
tions 8.0 and 9.0 do not differ significantly from 
zero at the 10 percent probability level. How-
ever, the coefficient in equation 7.0, might differ 
significantly from zero, as indicated by the "t" 
value. 
IMPLICATIONS 
Rice would substitute for potatoe'3 more under 
free market conditions and low incomes than un-
der artificial pricing and high personal income. 
The ~ n a lyses do not divulge any significant re-
sults relative to the actual relationships. The 
sign of the regression coefficient does imply a dif-
ferent relationship under free and artificial pric-
ing. 
THE RICE INDUSTRY IN THE FREE 
MARKET AND UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
PRICE PROGRAMS 
It often is difficult for producers of an agri-
cultural commodity to engage in an enterprise 
that requires an investment as large as rice pro-
duction if faced with extreme variation in rice 
prices. This situation is particularly pertinent 
in an agricultural enterprise where fixed costs 
are relatively high. 
A market for rice, albeit a free or a govern-
ment support price market, in which there is a 
reasonable degree of price and income stability 
benefits for both the producer and the consumer. 
A reduction in price instability below free mar-
ket levels makes for greater efficiency on the 
part of producers and a more constant supply to 
consumers at le'3s variable prices. 
Price programs, irrespective of how they are 
formulated, must consider price and income elas-
ticities both in the domestic and foreign markets, 
because of differences in human response to in-
come and price charges and the quality of prod-
ucts demanded in the various markets. 
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In recent years, foreign import markets 
American rice have played a vital role in 
ing an outlet for approximately 50 per cent 
United States annual production of rice. 
present level of rice production is main 
increased, foreign rice markets will have 
sorb a sizable percentage of the United 
annual supply in the next 5 to 10 years. In 
absence of foreign outlets for a sizable 
age of the United States annual rice s 
of two alternatives is available to rice 
Either producers must reduce production 
subsidized through some type of 
program. It always is difficult to say 
ticular course of action will be more ad 
ous to the general welfare of all people. 
annual supply of rice is needed for hu 
sumption both domestically and abroad 
no immediate need for a reduction in the 
level of rice production. If available 
supplies are in excess of the amount 
be taken at a price on the world market 
profitable to all producers, there is but one 
native, some producers will have to shift 
ces presently devoted to rice production into 
uses. Wben aggregate demand for rice 
the annual world supply at support price 
United States exportable sut'-plies should 
freely into foreign markets unless they are 
ed through trade barriers or the price 
established by the countries involved. 
rupt fall in rice exports, as was experi 
1954, calls for a reappraisal of the pri 
tem in the United States in the light of 
ences in price and income elasticities of 
in various markets, relevant price p 
tween countries and the world price. 
Several alternative price programs have 
proposed or considered for rice. Price 
for rice have been in operation every year 
rice was added to the list of basic . 
commodities in 1941. 
The three alternative programs for 
cussed in this section are (1) no support 
(2) flexible support prices and (3) a 
system. 
No Support Price Program 
Rice farmers produced ~nd sold on a 
ket prior to 1941. The rice industry was 
tively small and represented a minute 
the agricultural economy of the United 
fore World War II. Even at present, 
come to the rice industry represents 
percent of the ,l!ross income from all 
commodities. However, producer'1 
marily in rice production are vitally :l 
the position of the rice industry in the 
agricultural economy. 
Generally, rice producers were not 
greatly over world market prices during 
free market conditions since only small 
of rice were exported during that 
world market price usually exceeded the 
States domestic free market price by the amount 
of tariff duties and ocean freight charges for 
rice. The problem of disposing of exportable 
rice was not serious before World War II because 
production remained just slightly above domestic 
requirements. During this period, Cuba received 
the greater percentage of United States export-
able rice supplies. With a free market, the price 
i set by the marginal producer and rice supplies 
tend to approach equilibrium with demand at that 
price. 
On the basis of statistical inferences, it ap-
pears that, in the long run, total United States 
rice production today probably would remain at 
about the same level or slightly higher, under 
free market conditions. The basic assumption is 
that aggregate demand for rice is relatively stable 
and apparently increases in direct proportion to 
the dynamic growth of world population. The 
latter statement assumes no drastic deviation in 
human consumption habits imposed through gov-
ernment policies and intervention. The immed-
iate consequences of imposing free market con-
ditions on the present rice industry would be 
maIler returns and needed production adjust-
ments. Over time, the marginal producer would 
be forced out of the industry" and production 
would adjust to levels indicated. 
The short-run adverse consequences, and the 
fact that many other agricultural and industrial 
commodities are subsidized, are probable reasons 
why the present rice industry is not subjected 
to free market conditions. 
A Flexible Support Price Program 
A flexible price program is designed to sta-
bilize income with varying rice production. The 
rice industry had rigid support prices (90 percent 
of parity) during 1941-54 and flexible support 
beginning with the 1955 rice crop. It ap-
(Table 9) that income was stablized more 
support price programs than in the un sup-
market. The level of support is set by the 
ID!Cretary of Agriculture based on the relation 
actual to normal supply. The percentage of 
'ty is graduated up or down between 75 and 
ent of parity according to the percentage 
that actual supply is below or above the 
supply, respectively. 
In the event actual supply exceeds the normal 
1_l1nnl" by a certain percentage, production con-
might be deemed necessary. A reduction 
rice supplies under present price programs has 
approached through farmers voting in a 
~.lUelrendu :m to cut back acreage and assess mar-
quotas. .A marketing quota is the quan-
rice that can be produced on the alloted 
Acreage allotments and marketing quo-
were approved by rice producers in a referen-
for the first time in February 1955. There 
been an acreage allotment and marketing 
for rice every year since 1954. A flexible 
program can be effective in controlling the 
of rice if production is controlled rather 
than acreage alone. Rice acreage was reduced 24.7 
percent for the 1955 crop, but yields increased 
about 22 percent. Consequently, production was 
reduced only 3 percent instead of approximately 
25 percent as was planned by acreage allotments 
and marketing quotas. However, a sliding scale 
price program eventually would solve the con-
tinued over-production phase of the program, but 
inevitably would force many marginal producers 
out of the industry. 
An agricultural commodity with an inelastic 
demand and depending heavily on foreign import 
markets in which the demand is more elastic, will 
encounter difficulty with flexible price support 
levels set too high in relation to world market 
prices. This is precisely what happened to rice 
exports after 1953. There actually are two types 
of export markets for United States rice. Asian 
markets are quantity markets and the people in 
these markets are, therefore, much more respon-
sive to price differentials between United States 
domestic and world prices than are European 
people who are in a quality market. For instance, 
the support price was 35 cents per hundredweight 
greater than the free market price in 1954 and, 
as a consequence, United States rice exports were 
reduced to about two-thirds of the quantity ex-
ported in 1953. European consumers in the qual-
ity market will pay a premium for United States 
rice rather than purchase lower quality rice at a 
discount in the world market. American rice pro-
ducers are concerned primarily with the Asian 
quantity markets since they offer the greater op-
portunity for continued volume sales. 
Rice disposal problems have become increas-
ingly difficult since 1954, with substantial gov-
ernment rice purchases in some years since 1953. 
In those years, there was a transfer of income 
from taxpayers and consumers to producers. Al-
though Public Law 480 alleviated somewhat the 
burden of holding Commodity Credit Corporation 
rice stocks in 1956-57, it represented an addi-
tional income transfer from United States tax-
payers to foreign consumers. Public Law 480 
should not be construed as entirely ineffective in 
disposing of surplus rice relative to the function-
ing of normal marketing operations. In reality, 
the government serves in the capacity of a mid-
d1em9n between American rice exporters and for-
eign importers. The law merely permits the gov-
ernment to dispose of Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration rice through sales to foreign countries by 
accepting their currency. The foreign currency in 
turn is used in international currency exchange 
operations, military procurements, American in-
stallations in foreign countries and many other 
financial transactions. 
If an agricultural commodity has only a do-
mestic market, a flexible price program would ap-
pear more effective in maintaining the supply of 
the commodity in line with demand at various 
price levels. The difficulty resulting from having 
a domestic and a world market for a commodity 
arises from a difference in the elasticity of de-
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mand in the two markets and keeping govern-
ment supported prices in line with world prices. 
A flexible price program for rice has other 
shortcomings besides markets, prices and demand 
concepts. Continued acreage restrictions and 
marketing quotas eventually would force many 
rice producers out of the industry because of lim-
ited alternative land uses and high production 
costs. 
A Two-Price Program 
A two-price system is designed to establish a 
relatively high price in the domestic market and 
generally a lower price in the export market. 
It is presupposed, under this plan, that domes-
tic consumers will take what they will at a speci-
fied price level and that foreign consumers will 
take the remaining supply at a price they are 
willing to pay. 
If the demand in the domestic market is in-
elastic and more elastic in the export market, the 
plan has greater income-producing potentials than 
has the free market. There will be increased ex-
penditures by domestic consumers for a smaller 
quantity, but increased returns from larger sales 
in the export market. It would be difficult to 
estimate the magnitude of the income transfer 
from taxpayer to producer under a two-price plan 
as compared with other price programs without 
knowing the relevant elasticities of demand. 
However, if handling, storage, financing, disposi-
tion and administration costs are examined for 
rice under the flexible price program, a two-price 
plan appears to be more relevant since producers 
depend so heavily on foreign outlets for a large 
percentage of their annual rice production. 
In considering a two-price system for rice, it 
should be remembered that rice is used primarily 
for food and has practically no substitutes. Rice 
is the basic food for all Asiatic people and United 
States rice should be in great demand in these 
countries. However, the price differential be-
tween United States and Asiatic rice has been 
too large in recent years for Asians to buy our 
higher-priced rice. 
A two-price system for rice could recapture 
Asiatic markets. Since theEe countries import 
practically no other food commodity from the 
United States, rice exports would benefit both 
the United States producer and the Asiatic con-
sumer. The United States should not encounter 
any export-import difficulty since only two coun-
tries in Asia (Burma and Thailand) export any 
sizable quantities of rice. If Asiatic markets 
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were privileged to purchase United 
at prevailing world prices, it is logical to 
that domestic exportable supplies and f 
mand would approach an equilibrium 
alleviate the burden of purchasing and 
surplus rice in Commodity Credit 
warehouses. 
Reciprocal trade agreements with 
mit unencumbered entry and re-entry 
tural commodities between the United 
Cuba. These agreements would permit 
under a two-price plan, to enter Cuba at 
mestic price rather than at lower 
The trade privilege does not ne(~essarilv : 
that more rice would be sold-perhaps 
be sold at the domestic price level. The 
sold would depend in part on the extent 
tering agreements. Cuba, however, is 
position to obtain substantial quantities 
States rice relative to exportable ,;,ULIUIU:;a., 
by dollar purchas:es or by bartering. 
An inelastic demand and a constant 
domestic per capita consumption 
price structure that will regain and 
able export markets for United States 
suIts and inferences obtained from the 
cal analyses indicate that a two-price 
has the necessary pricing mechanism 
Unit€d States producers to compete 
markets and permit present rice p 
to remain in the industry. 
Methods of support prices are mostly 
decisions. A thorough evaluation of 
- grams can be made only with regard 
tablished set of values and con 
hoped that this analysis will afford 
derstanding of the difficulty encou 
riving at these decisions. 
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